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Samira Achbita & Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor
racismebestrijding v G4S Secure Solutions NV
Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez*
Rulings by the European Court of Justice are seldom as anxiously awaited as those
delivered by the Grand Chamber inMarch 2017 in the Bougnaoui and Achbita cases.1
To be sure, the preliminary references by both the French Cour de cassation and the
BelgianHof van Cassatie triggered much restlessness for at least three reasons. First, to
put the matter in context, the topic of religious freedom (and religious discrimination)
has become increasingly prominent in Europe and beyond; the topic of religious
minorities (and Islam in particular) tends to occupy centre stage at many debates on
integration, migration, and national identity, not to mention the issues of national
security and terrorism. Second, the two referrals made in 2015 led to the ﬁrst
authoritative interpretation by the European Court of Justice of the meaning of
‘religious discrimination’ under the 2000/78 Directive – a mere 17 years after the text
was passed. Finally, tension and attention were heightened by the strongly opposing
opinions of Advocate Generals Sharpston and Kokott.2
The two questions addressed to the European Court of Justice did exhibit some
differences in terms of their original formulation, but beyond the fact that they were
delivered on the same day, the rulings do need to be read together in order to fully
grasp the scope and meaning of the Court’s intervention. French legal authorities had
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1ECJ 14 March 2017, Case C-188/15, Asma Bougnaoui & ADDH v Micropole SA and ECJ 14
March 2017, Case C-157/15, Samira Achbita & Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor
racismebestrijding v G4S Secure Solutions NV.
2The opinions were delivered on, respectively, 13 July 2016 and 31 May 2016.
asked the Court whether the ﬁring of a female worker who wore the veil on the basis
of customer complaints voiced to her employer fell under the concept of religious
discrimination in the sense of the Directive. Somewhat distinctively, the question
emanating from Belgium concerned the admissibility of a company’s internal rule
that required workers to observe religious, political and philosophical neutrality: did
such a rule amount to discrimination in any form, either direct or indirect?
It is argued here that the combined rulings may fall short of effectively combating
the practice they deemed illegal, namely: a generalisation of religious discrimination in
the workplace based on the pretext of customer preference – which is indeed the
socio-political issue that lies below the surface of the facts in both cases.
The French Bougnaoui case directly echoes contemporary concerns about
growing Islamophobia. A Muslim woman who wore the veil was hired by an IT
company. Although warned by her employer that if her veil disturbed the
company’s customers she might be asked to remove it, she was able to work there
for a year and a half without difﬁculties. In June 2009, however, one customer did
complain, asking that service be provided in future by ‘unveiled’ workers, and she
was ﬁred after refusing to remove hers. Claiming that the termination of her
contract was discriminatory, she took her case to court. Her claims were, however,
rejected by both the Labour and appellate courts. The French judicial supreme
court chose to refer the question of whether customer preference of the sort that
had clearly dictated Ms Bougnaoui’s employer’s decision to terminate her
employment constituted ‘genuine and determining professional requirements’
under Article 4§1 of Directive 2000/89. In a March 2017 Grand Chamber ruling,
the European Court of Justice answered in the negative, thereby indicating that
the decision to ﬁre an employee because of a customer’s distaste for her religion
could amount to religious discrimination. Despite this unambiguous clariﬁcation,
the Court’s second intervention – in the Belgian referral – could potentially
weaken the long-awaited judicial interpretation of EU anti-discrimination law’s
take on religion in the workplace. The Achbita ruling has its origin in a Belgian
company’s decision to ﬁre a female Muslim receptionist who wore the veil on the
grounds that the company was committed to a strict policy of political,
philosophical, and religious neutrality that prohibited employees from expressing
any such convictions at work. Referring to the right to conduct a business, the
Court decided that internal policies of neutrality did not necessarily amount to either
direct or indirect discrimination since the aim was legitimate, provided the policy was
applied in a consistent and systematic manner. It is feared that the combination of
these two rulings could be read as a signal to private undertakings that, although they
ought not restrict their employees’ freedom of religion on the grounds of their
customers’ prejudiced preferences, they can, however, legitimately anticipate such
prejudices by internalising neutrality rules and policies – thereby avoiding any ‘risk’ of
interfering with their employees’ expression of beliefs and convictions. Accordingly,
the present case note presents a critical reading of these much-anticipated rulings,3 on
the grounds that they can be read as posing a risk of neutralising anti-discrimination
law in general, while simultaneously weakening the conception and operationality of
religious discrimination in particular.
Neutralising anti-discrimination law?
Samira Achbita started working at G4S as a receptionist in 2003. In 2006, she
expressed the wish to start wearing an Islamic headscarf in the workplace – a choice
that conﬂicted with an until-then unwritten policy that required all workers to
refrain from expressing any political, philosophical or religious beliefs while at
work. In front of her persistence, the unwritten rule was formalised by means of an
amendment to the workplace regulations adopted by the G4S work council – and
Achbita was subsequently dismissed. She claimed that the dismissal was
discriminatory and her case eventually led the Belgian Hof van Cassatie to refer
the matter to the European Court of Justice, posing the question of whether an
internal policy demanding workers’ neutrality amounted to a form of (direct)
discrimination outlawed by Directive 2000/78.
The Court answered in the negative, following a problematic line of
argumentation that could be summed up colloquially by saying that, in matters
of discrimination, ‘more’ somehow amounts to ‘less’, or: if you discriminate
against all members of a group (for their religion or convictions), you discriminate
against none (I.1.). When it subsequently examined the question of whether
employer-imposed neutrality policies could amount to indirect discrimination,
the European Court of Justice further enhanced the legitimacy of companies’
choice to institute policies that imposed political, philosophical and religious
neutrality on their workers on the grounds of freedom to conduct a business. Such
policies are only subject to the double condition that they be pursued by means
both appropriate and necessary for achieving neutrality (I.2.). As it subsequently
disregarded the relevance of the concepts of both direct and indirect
3Criticism seems to be the dominant tone of the ﬁrst wave of scholarly commentary triggered by
these cases. See, for instance, E. Brems, ‘European Court of Justice Allows Bans on Religious Dress in the
Workplace’, <https://iacl-aidc-blog.org/2017/03/25/analysis-european-court-of-justice-allows-bans-on-
religious-dress-in-the-workplace/>, visited 11 October 2017; T. Ufarte, ‘La liberte ́ de conscience face au
culte de la liberte ́ d’entreprise prône ́ par la CJUE : Une nouvelle guerre de religion ?’, Revue des droits de
l’homme [En ligne], Actualiteś Droits-Liberteś, available at <http:// revdh.revues.org/3056>, visited
12 July 2017; S. Jolly, ‘Achbita & Bougnaoui: A Strange kind of Equality’, available at <www.cloisters.
com/blogs/achbita-bougnaoui-a-strange-kind-of-equality>, visited 11 October 2017; S. Ouad Chaib
and V. David, ‘European Court of Justice keeps the door to religious discrimination in the private
workplace opened’, available at <https://strasbourgobservers.com/2017/03/27/european-court-of-
justice-keeps-the-door-to-religious-discrimination-in-the-private-workplace-opened-the-european-court-
of-human-rights-could-close-it/>, visited 11 October 2017.
discrimination in terms of their ability to curtail, if not prohibit, the kind of
internal company rule that was at stake in the Achbita case, it could reasonably be
stated that the European Court of Justice may well have weakened or effectively
neutralised EU anti-discrimination law.
More is less? Failing to see an instance of direct discrimination
In the course of examining the internal rule that required all workers to refrain
from wearing signs expressing their political, philosophical or religious beliefs, the
European Court of Justice found that it treated all workers the same way by
requiring them to dress neutrally (§30). As it paid more speciﬁc attention to how
the rule precipitated Achbita’s dismissal, it found that it had not been applied to
her any differently than it would have been to any other worker. The Court thus
concluded that there was no instance of direct discrimination: ‘it must be
concluded that an internal rule such as that at issue in the main proceedings does
not introduce a difference of treatment that is directly based on religion or belief,
for the purposes of Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78’ (§32).
In a classic levelling down of the very concept of non-discrimination,4 the
Court here neutralises much of the promise of Directive 2000/78, potentially
favouring outcomes that are at odds with EU anti-discrimination law’s very raisons
d’être. The Court puts forth a reasoning by which the fact that the ban adopted by
G4S’s work council concerned all convictions (religious, political or philosophical)
made it discrimination-proof: it could not be claimed that religious convictions
were subjected to a harsher regime than political or philosophical ones. This is,
however, hardly a convincing line of reasoning. As has already been noted, the
Court’s reasoning rests on a debatable if not ﬂawed choice of comparator; a
situation that entails discrimination on the grounds of religious beliefs should not
only be assessed by comparing it to the treatment of persons expressing other
beliefs, but also to persons expressing no belief. The Court insists that ‘the internal
rule at issue in the main proceedings refers to the wearing of visible signs of
political, philosophical or religious beliefs and therefore covers any manifestation
of such beliefs without distinction’ and that ‘the rule must, therefore, be regarded
as treating all workers of the undertaking in the same way by requiring them, in a
general and undifferentiated way, inter alia, to dress neutrally, which precludes the
wearing of such signs’ (§30). But this is akin to saying that, say, since all disabled
workers are subjected to any given restriction of their rights (for instance, different
treatment in the calculation of their paid work hours based on the fact that
disabled workers need more time to reach their workstation within the work
4On which, see for instance T. Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press
2014) in particular p. 153.
premises), none is in fact discriminated against.5 The rationale here is really
perverse, in the sense that it amounts to considering that if you discriminate
against all members of a group, you actually no longer are discriminating at all.
Anti-discrimination law is, in other words, neutralised6 in its very capacity to cover
certain realities and social practices it was initially set up to help combat. Some
authors even consider that discrimination has now in fact been legitimised; the
Court has provided employers with a ‘recipe for discrimination of their employees
on the basis of their religious or other beliefs’.7
Neutrality policies as marketing and the demise of the right to non-discrimination in
the workplace
Once it ruled that neutrality policies could formally be put in place by private
undertakings without causing direct discrimination, the European Court of Justice
examined whether the concept of indirect discrimination could nonetheless apply.
Recalling the deﬁnition of indirect discrimination in the sense of Directive 2000/
78, the Court explained that indirect discrimination would ensue if the neutrality
policy resulted in particular disadvantage for persons adhering to a particular
religion or belief.8 It further insisted that such disadvantage would, however, not
qualify as indirect discrimination if the policy pursued a ‘legitimate aim’ by means
‘appropriate and necessary’. It is argued here that, well beyond the particulars of
either the Bougnaoui or Achbita cases, the Court’s interpretation of these notions
could potentially turn the very concept of indirect discrimination vis-à-vis any kind
of neutrality policy into a paper tiger.9 This is particularly true since the Court
5This point is also made by S. Laulom, ‘Un affaiblissement de la protection européenne contre
les discriminations’, Semaine Sociale Lamy, 27 March 2017, n°1762; see alsoOuad Chaib and David,
supra n. 3.
6Some have argued in comparable instances that discrimination is ‘covered’: see K. Yoshino,
Covering: the Hidden Assault on our Civil Rights (Random House 2007).
7Ouad Chaib and David, supra n. 3; see also E. Brems, supra n. 3: ‘In that sense, the judgment
can be read as a “how-to” for employers wishing to discriminate against headscarf wearers: introduce
a neutrality policy that applies to all types of religious dress; apply it consistently; apply it only to
front-ofﬁce employees; and if you want to dismiss a person, make sure to motivate why you cannot
offer that person a back-ofﬁce job’. Note also the provocative title of the New York Times article:
‘Legalizing Discrimination in Europe’, 15 March 2017.
8 In §34 of the Achbita ruling, the ECJ expresses the view that ‘it is conceivable’ that such a rule
might affect some religions more than others. As Gareth Davies notes, this is largely absurd, for what
really is inconceivable is that it would not: G Davies, ‘Achbita v. G4S: Religious Equality
Squeezed Between Proﬁt and Prejudice’, European Law Blog (6 April 2017) available at <https://
europeanlawblog.eu/2017/04/06/achbita-v-g4s-religious-equality-squeezed-between-proﬁt-and-
prejudice/>, visited 11 October 2017.
9To the extent that ‘the ruling could be understood as conﬁrming that the mere wish of a
company to present itself in a neutral way is an objective justiﬁcation for a different treatment of
chose to rule that an employer’s ‘desire to display, in relation with both public and
private sector customers, a policy of political, philosophical and religious
neutrality’ is a priori legitimate (§37). The Court here refers to Article 16 of the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, insisting that the ‘right to conduct a business’
encompasses an employer’s right to impose a policy of strict neutrality. The Court
thus expressly condones possible choices for neutrality in so far as they have to do
with private undertakings’ self-deﬁned image – and consequently, marketing
strategy.10 Such a choice ‘must be considered legitimate […] notably where only
those workers who are required to come into contact with customers’ – i.e. those
who convey the company’s image – are subjected to the neutrality requirement.
This section of the Court’s ruling is of utmost importance from both an anti-
discrimination law and human rights perspective. In its consideration of the
referrals made by the French and Belgian courts, the Court read Directive 2000/
78 in light of the Charter, but chose to do so only to interpret the ‘legitimate aim’
that would allow a company to indirectly discriminate, and only with respect to
the fundamental rights of private undertakings (in particular, their freedom to
conduct a business) rather than those of individuals. As a result, the ‘fundamental
rights’ perspective is hardly relevant to the rulings, which remain essentially silent
on individuals’ rights to spiritual integrity, religious freedom, autonomy, and
dignity. As far as anti-discrimination law is concerned, the Court’s reasoning in the
Achbita case makes the scope and strength of EU anti-discrimination law
subordinate to marketing considerations and the freedom to conduct a business.
Indeed, conﬁrmation that a desire to display an image of neutrality is to be
considered a legitimate aim for the differential treatment of workers under Article
2§2b) of the Directive reverses the hierarchy between the principle of the
Directive’s Article 2 (a principle of non-discrimination) and exceptions thereto
(except if/when the discrimination – differential treatment – pursues a legitimate
aim). The very fact of enunciating that, as a general rule (i.e. as a matter of
principle) a neutrality policy ought to be considered legitimate regardless of the
particular circumstances, settings, impact etc., potentially reverses the relationship
between principle and exception. In fact, one might now wonder: what prevents
private undertakings from reading this instrumental part of the Achbita ruling as
allowing them to require and implement policies of neutrality as a matter of free
enterprise – except if and when those policies would appear to be inappropriate or
unnecessary and excessive?
employees’ [emphasis added]: M. Steijns, ‘Achbita and Bougnaoui: Raising More Questions Than
Answers’, available at <https://eutopialaw.com/2017/03/18/achbita-and-bougnaoui-raising-more-
questions-than-answers/>, visited 11 October 2017.
10C. Wolmark, ‘Peut-on concevoir la neutralité dans l’entreprise?’, Revue de droit du travail
(2017) p. 235: ‘la neutralité, une politique marketing’.
Alongside the requirement that they pursue a legitimate aim, neutral
provisions, criteria or practices must thus also appear to be appropriate and
necessary, lest they qualify as forms of indirect discrimination that place persons
who adhere to a particular religion or belief at a disadvantage when compared with
other persons. But will such requirements effectively manage to contain the scope
of the ruling? Should they be understood to mean that not all such policies are to
be considered admissible under EU anti-discrimination law? Although some
scholars express this view,11 it remains essentially unclear as the very deﬁnition
given by the Court – of both these additional hurdles containing the concept of
indirect discrimination – also remains fuzzy and imprecise.
As to the condition of appropriateness, the Court rules that internal rules and
policies that require neutrality of convictions can constitute ‘appropriate means’
towards a legitimate aim provided the policy is pursued in a ‘consistent and systematic’
manner (§40). The precise meaning of such criteria remains, however, imprecise. In
the Achbita case, the Court established that application of the neutrality policy – to all
workers in contact with customers, for all convictions (religious but also philosophical
and political) – was to be interpreted, even prior to its formalisation in the internal
rules of the company, as an indication that it was indeed a ‘consistent and systematic’
policy. But other cases will undoubtedly arise that question the meaning of these
criteria. For instance, what about supermarkets and food chains that choose to sell
halal, kosher or otherwise religiously vetted products: would it be ‘consistent and
systematic’ for such undertakings to simultaneously require religious neutrality from
their personnel?Would it be ‘consistent and systematic’ to offer diversity to customers
while denying the expression thereof to the workforce? Arguably, both the choice of
what one sells and who interacts with customers for the purposes of selling it can be
framed as pertaining to a business’s ‘image’.
As to the condition of necessity, the European Court of Justice insists that as
long as the neutrality policy covers only those workers who interact with
customers, it is to be deemed necessary (§42). Two observations can be made.
First, the latter criterion, that can impede application of the qualiﬁcation of
indirect discrimination, is somewhat tautological with respect to the ﬁrst. The
reasoning of the Court does indeed amount to saying that a policy of neutrality
must be considered to pursue a legitimate aim if and when it is necessary to require
neutrality from workers to convey a policy of neutrality. In other words, the condition
of ‘necessity’ and that of the ‘legitimate aim’ coincide in the Court’s reasoning.
Second, it remains – again – a rather fuzzy criterion; a great amount of leeway is
left for national judicial determinations of which categories of workers are
considered to ‘interact with customers’: are these only the front desk personnel
who effectively represent the company, or should they include janitors who
11G. Calvès, ‘Religion au travail: que nous enseigne la CJUE ?’, 8 Feuillet Rapide Social (2017).
operate on premises that are accessible to customers? Is it even possible to identify
categories of workers who never come in contact with a company’s customers? In
fact, the insistence by many companies that technical, sanitary or logistical
personnel wear uniforms could be read as an indication that they do consider their
companies to be represented by those personnel categories. At any rate, even if it
were the case that certain worker categories never interact with customers and
therefore would need to be exempted from a requirement of neutrality since they
do not convey the company’s image, one wonders: would such an understanding
of the Court’s position not lead to ‘closeting’ workers who wish to express their
convictions (religious or otherwise) in back-ofﬁce jobs12 – and would it encourage
employers to conceal any diversity that might be present in their workforce?
Weakening the concept of religious discrimination
Among the grounds of discrimination that deﬁne the scope of EU anti-
discrimination law, religion is probably the most hotly contested. In fact, some
authors even argue that anti-discrimination law is ill-adapted to operate in the ﬁeld
of religion and expressions thereof.13 The 2017 Achbita and Bougnaoui rulings
certainly strengthen this view; they illustrate the Court’s difﬁculty in legally
grasping and dispensing justice in religious discrimination cases. In both rulings,
however, the European Court of Justice displays a relatively robust understanding
of how ‘religion’ ought to be deﬁned under the 2000/78 Directive (II.1.). The
Court also clearly rules that the notion of ‘genuine and determining occupational
requirement’ that may exempt differences of treatment from anti-discrimination
claims must rely on objective considerations only – thus discarding subjective
views held by employers. This invocation of a basic tenet of anti-discrimination
law (customer preferences are not to be used to justify instances of discrimination),
however, risks falling short of its promise (II.2.).
‘Religion’ under anti-discrimination law
Remarkably, the 2017 rulings are the ﬁrst by the European Court of Justice that
deal with issues of religious discrimination. The comparably small number of
12On this issue see K. Alidadi, ‘Out of sight, out of mind? Implications of routing religiously
dressed employees away from front-ofﬁce positions in Europe’, 1 Quaderni di diritto e politica
ecclesiastica (2013) p. 87.
13Furthermore, among those who do not attempt to invoke the relevance of the concept of
religious discrimination as such, the normative reasons for its validity remain debated. For a recent
contribution denying the foundational nature of the concept of ‘autonomy’ for religious freedom, see
F. Ahmed, ‘The Autonomy Rationale for religious freedom’, 80(2) Modern Law Review (2017)
p. 238.
judicial interpretations of racial discrimination under Directive 2000/4314
reminds us that social reality must not be confused with litigated reality. We
should indeed wonder why there has been such a limited amount of litigation.
Does this testify to the efﬁciency of national mechanisms – judicial, as well as
those that are offered by non-judicial ‘Equality’ bodies? Or does it rather hint at
broader issues: hindered access to legal remedies for victims of discrimination, or
possibly even a more general failure of the goal of anti-discrimination to appear
valuable and pertinent to the very groups it seeks to protect most?
At any rate, these pioneering interpretations of the Directive were impatiently
awaited if only because of a number of expressions of doubt, scholarly opinions
included, as to the relevance of anti-discrimination law to religion. In particular, several
authors have expressed the view that, since religion is not an inalterable or immutable
feature of one’s identity, it cannot easily seek shelter under the protective umbrella of
anti-discrimination law.15 In fact, this view surfaces in the opinion of Advocate General
Kokott in the Belgian case. She considers that ‘unlike sex, skin color, ethnic origin,
sexual orientation, age or a person’s disability, the practice of religion is not so much an
unalterable fact as an aspect of an individual’s private life, and one, moreover, over
which the employee concerned can choose to exert an inﬂuence. While an employee
cannot “leave” his sex, skin color, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age or disability “at the
door” upon entering his employer’s premises, he may be expected to moderate the
exercise of his religion in the workplace, be this in relation to religious practices,
religiously motivated behavior or (as in the present case) his clothing’16.
Such reasoning of course raises many questions. First, because it suggests that
all elements of identity that are ‘chosen’ by individuals could be considered to fall
outside the scope of protection granted by anti-discrimination law for that reason.
Yet the reach and implications of this line of reasoning, when applied to grounds
other than religion, easily show how excessive and debateable it is. Take, for
instance, issues of health and disability: one could easily predict that all protection
would be revoked if employers were allowed to take into consideration whether, or
the extent to which, workers’ medical conditions were a result of their own
choices. Such a line of reasoning could easily jeopardise the right to have a say in
one’s medical treatment (or the right to refuse medical treatment altogether).
Second, it must be noted that the ‘differential’ interpretation suggested by
Advocate General Kokott – between religion and the other prohibited grounds of
14See ECJ 10 July 2008, Case C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor
racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV.
15See for instance G. Calvès, ‘Les discriminations fondées sur la religion : quelques remarques
sceptiques’, in E. Lambert-Abdelgawad, T. Rambaud (eds.), Les discriminations religieuses en Europe
(SLC 2009) p. 9.
16§116. AG Sharpston, by constrast, argues in her opinion that religion ought not to be
distinguished from sex or skin colour.
discrimination mentioned by the Directive – lacks any formal ground in the
Directive itself. Rather, the whole point of the Directive is to protect workers from
discrimination ‘on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual
orientation as regards employment and occupation’ – and precisely, without any
distinction being made among the listed grounds. To that extent, the notion that
religious beliefs should never be expressed on work premises introduces a distinction
that ﬁnds no support in the legislative framework. Finally, such interpretations of
‘religion as choice’ run afoul of the necessity, for anti-discrimination law and its
interpreters, to take religion seriously. For, indeed, if religious discrimination is to be
prohibited, it is not for secular judicial interpretations thereof to decide that religion
is a matter of choice – or of anything else for that matter; for instance, a calling. For
deeply religious individuals, the very notion that religious beliefs and the sartorial
(or other) expressions thereof can be set aside and relegated to the coatrack the same
way a political sticker, pin, or button can be temporarily removed or hidden, is
outrageous – and fails to grasp the very stuff that religious belief is made of. Not to
mention the fact that ‘for many people the right to share their beliefs with others, or
to live publicly according to their religious convictions, is not merely a basic human
right but also a sacred duty’.17
For all these reasons, it was of great importance that the Court deﬁne the
notion of religion as it ought to be understood in the sense of Directive 2000/78.
And in fact, the concept adopted by the Court is a relatively robust one. After
referring to both Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Article 10 of the EU Charter of Fundamental rights (§§28-29), the European
Court of Justice makes it clear that EU law includes ‘the freedom of persons to
manifest their religion’ and that the term religion under Article 1 of the Directive
encompasses both the forum internum and the forum externum, i.e. the right to the
‘manifestation of religious faith in public’ (§30). Although it may seem a very
banal (re)afﬁrmation to some, it does have greater resonance in a number of
national settings where the very possibility of expressing one’s religious beliefs in
public has been increasingly challenged in recent years. France, to be sure, is a case
in point where the tension surrounding the constitutional principle and
republican value of laïcité has signiﬁcantly curtailed individuals’ freedom of
religion in recent years18 (much to the speciﬁc disadvantage of Muslim women19),
17P. Cumper, ‘The public manifestation of religion or belief: challenges for a multi-faith society in
the 21st century’, 4 Current Legal Issues: Law and Religion (2001) p. 311.
18S. Hennette-Vauchez, ‘Is French laïcité still liberal? The Republican project under pressure
(2004-2016)’, 17 Human Rights Law Review (2017) pp. 285-312.
19From among the many references, see J.W. Scott, The Politics of the Veil (Princeton University
Press 2007); M. Fernando, The Republic Unsettled (Duke University Press 2014); S. Hennette-
Vauchez, ‘Genre et religion: le genre de la ‘nouvelle laïcité’ , in S. Hennette-Vauchez, M. Pichard,
D. Roman (eds.), REGINE: La loi & le genre. Etudes critiques de droit français (CNRS) p. 715.
and where, subsequently, it is not uncommon to hear or read prominent political
actors expressing the (juridically erroneous) notion that expressions of religious
faith ought to be banished to the private sphere. And others countries seem to be
witnessing a progression of anti-religious sentiment as well.20
This relatively robust conception of religion as far as Directive 2000/78 is
concerned remains essentially toothless or idealistic, however, as it is not brought
to bear during the further steps in the Court’s reasoning – i.e., when the Court
moves on to examine the question referred by the French Cour de cassation,
namely: could the ﬁring of a female Muslim employee on the grounds that
customers had expressed their dislike of the headscarf qualify as discriminatory on
the grounds of religion?
Customer preferences and ‘genuine and determining occupational requirements’
In the Bougnaoui case, the European Court of Justice establishes that if and when a
private undertaking has formalised its neutrality policy in a formal rule – and
granted the rule is indeed neutral in that it does not refer to one religion in
particular and fails to distinguish between religious and other beliefs – indirect
discriminationmay ensue. But in such cases, the reasoning to be applied is the one
developed in the Achbita case, where the Court explains that such rules may cause
indirect discrimination unless they are found to pursue a ‘legitimate aim’ and are
20 In fact, as is noted by Eva Brems, it is quite astonishing that the Court should silence this
contextual element of the rulings. In her words: ‘It its bewildering to read a judgment of a
supranational court ruling on fundamental rights that discusses the issue of Islamic headscarf bans
without any reference to either the Europe-wide context of Islamophobia, or the widespread
existence of negative stereotypes about Muslim women, and in particular those who wear Islamic
dress. (…) What some may perceive as remaining on “neutral technical ground” is for others an
expression of an ivory tower mentality. As illustrated by the following anecdote: when ECJ President
Lenaerts read the judgment aloud in his native language Dutch, he read “Islamist headscarf” instead
of “Islamic headscarf”. In Dutch, this is only one letter extra (Islamitisch/Islamistisch), yet anyone
who has some degree of familiarity with debates on Islam is aware of the crucial difference. Not the
ECJ President, apparently’. In fact, the criticism can be made harsher still, for not only does the
Court not refer to the concerns raised by anti-religious sentiment in general and Islamophobia in
particular: AG Kokott seems to have herself participated in the legitimation of a number of
amalgams, as the opening lines of her opinion inexplicably insist on ‘the social sensitivity inherent in
[the] issue’ at stake (the ﬁring of Muslim women for wearing their headscarves at work) and ‘the
current political and social context in which Europe is confronted with an arguably unprecedented
inﬂux of third-country migrants and the question of how best to integrate persons from a migrant
background is the subject of intense debate in all quarters’. On that note, it is worth noting that far
from having anything to do with issues of integration, the two cases that reached the ECJ pertained
to two female workers who were well-integrated, notably through their employment. If at all, the
issue here is one of the judicial contribution to dis-integration, as the Court creates a legal framework
in which these female workers can be ﬁred.
implemented by means both ‘appropriate and necessary’.21 It also examines an
alternative situation, namely: when there is no such formalised internal rule
requiring neutrality, differential treatment could, under very limited
circumstances, be justiﬁed for reasons pertaining to ‘genuine and determining
occupational requirements’ as foreseen by Directive 2000/78’s Article 4§1. In this
particular case, the referring court was asking the European Court of Justice to
establish whether the willingness of an employer to take account of a customer’s
wish to no longer have services provided by a worker who, like Ms Bougnaoui,
wore an Islamic headscarf constituted a ‘genuine and determining occupational
requirement’ within the meaning of Article 4§1 of Directive 2000/78.
That the French Cour de cassation should refer that question to the European
Court of Justice is in and of itself quite remarkable, for it indeed sheds light on an
interesting paradox pertaining to the socio-political meaning of anti-
discrimination law in contemporary societies.22 On one hand, the issue of
customer preference might appear to raise such fundamental questions (‘anti-
discrimination law 101’23?) that the fact of it being referred to the European Court
of Justice in 2017 could be read as a formidable leap backwards from what we
thought was commonly understood about anti-discrimination law. What, indeed,
did the Greensboro Four24 and many others ﬁght for if, well over 50 years later,
the question – can customer preference justify the implementation of
discriminatory practices? – is still so fraught that France’s highest judicial court
would refer it to the European Court of Justice? On the other hand, the issue of
customer preference does in fact echo theoretical questions of profound
complexity pertaining to the scope of anti-discrimination law. In fact, it is
highly interesting that the European Court of Justice should choose to deﬁne the
‘legitimate’ desire of employers to impose a rule demanding neutrality of
21See above.
22V. Valentin, ‘Quelles perspectives pour la religion dans l’entreprise?’, Revue des droits et libertés
fondamentaux (2017) available at <www.revuedlf.com/droit-social/quelles-perspectives-pour-la-
religion-dans-lentreprise/>, visited 11 October 2017.
23 In fact, a French labour law specialist has underlined the fact that the Cour de cassation had
already ruled that customer preference could not be taken into account and that direct discrimination
could not be justiﬁed by such considerations. Wolmark then further suggests that the French Court’s
referral to the ECJ was thus to be understood as a willingness to disturb the solution reached in the
much-debated Baby Loup case (on which see Hennette-Vauchez, supra n. 18), implicitly increasing
the leeway of employers to restrict religious freedom in the workplace: see C. Wolmark, ‘Le foulard
dans l’entreprise: la CJUE invitée dans le débat’, 7-8 Droit Social (2015) p. 648.
24 In 1960 in Greensboro, North Carolina, Joseph McNeil, Franklin McCain, Ezell Blair Jr and
David Richmond, four black men, organised sit-ins at the Woolworth department store’s lunch
counter as a peaceful protest against the segregationist policies of the establishment. Whilst their
sit-ins were neither the ﬁrst nor the only ones, they have remained amongst the most famous of the
civil rights movement.
conviction from their employees as a concept grounded in the freedom to conduct
a business; framing it this way does indeed echo issues raised by Hannah Arendt in
her important ‘Reﬂections on Little Rock’ on the scope and reach of anti-
discrimination law.25
Ultimately, however, the European Court of Justice answered the question
referred by the French Cour de cassation in the negative. Reafﬁrming that anti-
discrimination law extends to private relations – between employers and
employees – thereby making them subject to the relevance and legitimacy of a
juridical norm that constrains the former from discriminating against the latter
on a number of forbidden grounds, the Court ruled that the exception carved out
by Article 4§1 of the Directive should be interpreted narrowly. The notion of
‘genuine and determining occupational requirements’ ought thus to apply only to
situations in which the nature of the activities concerned objectively demands that
the employees’ religion (or sex, ability…) be taken into account; it can never cover
subjective considerations such as ‘the willingness of the employer to take account
of the particular wishes of the customer’ (§40).
It now falls to national courts to draw conclusions from the European Court of
Justice rulings of March 2017 – in both the Achbita and Bougnaoui cases, and
beyond. As far as the French case goes, it is safe to predict that French courts will
ﬁnd the ﬁring of Ms Bougnaoui discriminatory; it is hard to imagine that it could
be convincingly argued that removal of the headscarf Bougnaoui had been wearing
since day one was suddenly a ‘genuine and determining occupational requirement’
for the position of design engineer she had been holding, apparently to everyone’s
satisfaction, for over a year. But, from a wider socio-political perspective, however,
it is unclear to what extent this most probable legal resolution of the case will truly
have an impact on social practices inherent to the management of religious
expression and diversity issues in the workplace. In fact, when read in combination
with the Achbita case, the Bougnaoui ruling seems to lose its bite. For indeed, even
though it follows from the Bougnaoui case that employers ought not be outspoken
25H. Arendt, ‘Reﬂections on Little Rock’,Dissent, 1959. This is a very stimulating, albeit complex
and much-debated, text in which Arendt reacts to the deployment of federal troops to enforce Brown
v Board of Education and the ensuing unrest in several Southern localities. Her text seeks to delineate
the distinctions between ‘the public’, ‘the social’ and ‘the political’ and discusses the differentiated
legitimacy of anti-discrimination laws to intervene in these three spheres. Although her text raises
questions as to Arendt’s insensitivity to issues of racial injustice and segregation (on which, see
R. Ellison and H. Bentouhami, ‘Le cas de Little Rock: Hannah Arendt et Ralph Ellison sur la
question noire’, 10 Tumultes (2008) p. 268 or, more recently: M. Burroughs, ‘Hannah Arendt,
Reﬂections on Little Rock and White Ignorance’, 3(1) Critical Philosophy of Race (2015) p. 52), it
shines an interesting light on many contemporary, contentious issues pertaining to the scope and
legitimacy of anti-discrimination law. See M. Morey, ‘Reassessing Arendt’s “Reﬂections on Little
Rock”’, 10(1) Law, Culture and the Humanities (2014) pp. 88-110.
about basing decisions to dismiss personnel on customers preference, the ruling
somehow incites or invites them to anticipate difﬁculties, anxieties or reluctance
on the part of their clientele, and to internalise a possible solution in the form of a
neutrality requirement as a matter of internal company policy. With the exception of
the hardly insurmountable constraint of ensuring that the policy be enforced by
means appropriate (consistent and systematic) and necessary, the Achbita ruling
seems to provide a legal framework very favourable to such strategies.
Conclusion
Clearly, the 2017 rulings have, for many, come as a disappointment.26 They
certainly conﬁrm that religious discrimination is a contentious issue, not only
socially but also legally. The European Court of Human Rights does not seem to
be any more at ease; in several recent high-proﬁle religious freedom cases, it
disregarded allegations that Article 14 of the Convention had been violated.27 The
fact that both European courts seem to hesitate when faced with claims of religious
discrimination has generated increasing attention and indeed provoked more and
more theoretically sophisticated criticism from historians, sociologists, and gender
theory scholars as well as from social and political theorists. From a more limited
legal perspective, it seems that these cases suggest at least two main lines of
investigation: one theoretical and the other, political.
Theoretically, the Achbita and Bougnaoui rulings conﬁrm the need to deepen
our understanding of the connection between human rights law on the one hand
(and its capacity to protect religious freedom) and anti-discrimination law on the
other. To be sure, it seems intuitive that not every restriction on religious freedom
equals discrimination;28 in fact, legal deﬁnitions of religious discrimination
26 It is also in striking contrast with predictions, largely at odds with the merits of the rulings
examined here, that Directive 2000/78 ought to be interpreted as carving out a duty that weighs on
employers to accommodate employees’ needs, comparable if not identical to the duty that the
Directive expressly spells out with regard to disabilities; see for instance: J. Ringelheim, ‘Adapter
l’entreprise à la diversité des travailleurs: la portée transformatrice de la non-discrimination’, 1(1)
Journal européen des droits de l’homme / European Journal of Human Rights (2013) pp. 57-82; and
K. Alidadi, Religion, Equality and Employment in Europe: the Case for Reasonable Accommodation
(Hart 2017).
27For a critique of the ways the European Court of Human Rights has made ‘neutrality’ a central
concept of its Art. 9 case law, see J. Ringelheim, ‘State Religious Neutrality as a Common European
Standard? Reappraising the European Court of Human Rights Approach’, 6(1) Oxford Journal of
Law and Religion (2017) pp. 24-47.
28Lucy Vickers agrees that ‘despite the importance of religious freedom as a fundamental human
right, its protection in the work context should be limited, because of its complex and contested
interaction with the rights of other, whether they be employers, or those outside the religious group’,
but suggests that acknowledgment of an employers’ duty to accommodate would achieve greater
invariably refer to a differential or unequal treatment that unjustiﬁably takes
religion into account – and not to any restriction on religious freedom. The
situation on the ground is often trickier, however; the common grammar of
proportionality infuses both human rights law and anti-discrimination law, and
thus in the process often obfuscates not only the legal actors’ reasoning but,
potentially, the very matter at stake as well (a matter of discrimination or a (dis)
proportionate interference in one’s religious freedom?).
Politically, the Bougnaoui and Achbita cases, as well as the issue of religious
discrimination in contemporary Europe more generally, raise the question of the
price we are willing to pay for the preservation of (largely mythical) homogeneity
and uniformity. For indeed, it must be noted that although these cases went off to
Luxembourg as ‘headscarf cases’, they return to us today with a much vaster reach
– a boomerang out of control. Indeed, the general framework worked out by the
European Court of Justice in its two rulings allows companies to require not only
religious neutrality but, much more generally, political or philosophical neutrality,
from their employees as well. To the extent that ‘an image of neutrality’ is deﬁned
as constituting an a priori legitimate aim grounded in the freedom to conduct a
business, all convictions are susceptible of falling prey to neutrality policies
maintained by private undertakings. Arguably, this raises the question of how far
we are willing to cuddle – if not accommodate – the xenophobic/Islamophobic
tendencies that are gaining momentum in many European societies. Strikingly,
the Achbita and Bougnaoui rulings can be read as meaning that an employer’s
decision to decline to hire (or in this case, to ﬁre) female Muslim employees who
wear the headscarf is an acceptable answer to the anxieties raised by the growing
visibility of diversity in contemporary society. In fact, they could even be
construed to make the exclusion of female Muslim workers who wear the veil
acceptable, or perhaps even desirable: should we be getting ourselves ready to
accept further curtailments of our freedom of expression for the sake of making it
possible? Both referrals that preceded the March 2017 rulings left their national
settings as issues regarding the Islamic veil. They returned to France and Belgium
(and by extension, all EU member states) framed to encompass much broader
issues: the freedom to express any and all convictions in the workplace. This is
indeed quite alarming.
clarity and fairness than the anti-discrimination law model as it exists in the EU (i.e. one that does
not formulate such a duty in ﬁeld of religion – as opposed to disability): see L. Vickers, Religious
Freedom, Religious Discrimination in the Workplace, 2nd edn (Hart 2016).
